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Abstract We investigate the funding modes of German banks and the implications for
lending and profitability during 1992–2002. We find that at many banks, deposits from
customers decrease in relative terms while interbank liabilities increase as a source of
funding. We cannot detect a negative impact of the relative decline in deposits on lending.
The decreasing ability of banks to collect deposits and the substitution of deposits by
interbank liabilities unfavorably affects the net interest result of banks that exhibit a deposit
deficit, especially savings banks. Our findings indicate a structural lengthening of the
intermediation chain, which has broader implications for the functioning and stability of the
financial system.
Keywords Universal banking . Deposit taking . Interbank markets
JEL classification G21
1 Introduction
Deposit taking and lending represent key activities of universal and commercial banks.
Qualitative asset transformation, comprising lot size, maturity, and risk transformation, are
defining characteristics of these banks. In this paper, we investigate the funding modes of
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banks and the implications for lending and profitability. To do so, we take a micro
perspective to identify structural changes in banks’ balance sheets that influence the
intermediation chain in a financial system.
This topic is part of the broader literature on the role of banks. Long before the financial
crisis of 2007–2009, financial intermediaries were subject to considerable structural
changes, so there has been much discussion about the future of banks (Boyd and Gertler
1995; Edwards and Mishkin 1995; Rajan 1996; Miller 1998; Allen and Santomero 2001;
Bossone 2001). Banks have been facing challenges arising from globalization, liberaliza-
tion, consolidation, disintermediation, and financial innovations. These long-run develop-
ments indicate that financial intermediation is subject to substantial changes. Surprisingly,
other than anecdotal statements, there is relatively little empirical evidence for the impact of
these developments on banks’ funding modes (Schmidt et al. 1999). For example, some
researchers state that the structurally declining role of deposits represents a future critical
issue, because deposits were the most important funding source of German banks in the
past and have contributed significantly to their net interest income (Hackethal 2004).
In a preliminary analysis based on banking sector data from the 30 OECD countries over
the past 25 years, we find that in Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland,
deposits relative to total bank assets have steadily lost ground, but in Australia, Japan,
Netherlands, and the United States they have been stable. In Belgium, France, Hungary, and
Poland, deposits have even slightly gained in importance. The evolution of deposits is
somewhat ambiguous in the remaining countries of Europe.
In our analysis, we focus on the evolution of the funding structure of German banks over
the period 1992–2002. Germany, which has one of the world’s largest banking systems,
represents an interesting opportunity to study banks’ funding modes for several reasons: it
provides a typical example for a bank-based financial system. More importantly, like U.S.
banks, German banks rely heavily on deposits as a funding mode. In addition, the Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) report from the International Monetary Fund has
initiated a new debate on the future of Germany’s three-pillar banking system (Brunner et al.
2004). The three-pillar system’s diversity, which includes the two-tier structure with group-
central banks in the savings banks and cooperative sector, makes it possible for us to study
the funding modes of a wide range of different banks. To the best of our knowledge,
although Salas and Saurina (2002) provide evidence from Spain that the institutional form
clearly matters for the lending behavior of commercial and savings banks, ours is the first
study to differentiate between both deposit types and the institutional form of banks.
Moreover, our results are based on a micro data set that has not been used before to
investigate the funding modes of banks. Further, with the financial crisis that began in
2007, it has become evident that banks’ funding modes have broader implications for the
functioning and stability of the entire financial system.
We address the following three questions: How can we characterize the evolution of
deposits taken by German banks? What is the relation between deposits from customers and
other funding modes? What is the impact of potential changes of the liability structure on
the asset structure and bank profitability? Rather than explaining the evolution of deposits
or explicitly analyzing the effects of competition, we take the evolution of deposits as given
and examine its consequences for funding modes, lending, and profitability at the level of
the individual bank. This assumption makes it possible for us to analyze the interplay of
different types of funding modes, which would not have been possible if we had assumed
loan demand as exogenous.
Our paper relates to the studies that analyze financial systems (e.g., King and Levine
1993; Merton 1995; Allen and Gale 2000; Levine 2002; Krahnen and Schmidt 2004). For
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example, Domanski’s (1997) analysis of aggregate data for the German financial system
during 1970–1995 indicates a decline in the relative importance of deposits from customers
while the lending business does not decrease in relative terms. Schmidt et al. (1999)
investigate whether there is a trend towards disintermediation in Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom during the period 1982–1996. They find evidence that the ability of banks
to collect deposits from customers has declined because the intermediation chain has been
lengthened by mutual funds, and banks seem to specialize in lending while other nonbank
financial intermediaries specialize in providing investment products. Furthermore, Dinger
and von Hagen (2005) study the liberalized banking systems in Eastern Europe and find
that incumbent banks are able to generate higher profits than new entrants due to their
strong position in deposit markets. Additionally, these authors show that interbank
borrowing banks have a lower profitability than do those that rely on deposits from
customers as main funding mode.
Our paper also relates to the basic financial intermediation literature, especially to those
studies that focus on the deposit-taking role of banks. Early theoretical papers such as those by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991) provide rationales for the
existence of banks that hinge on deposit taking and the beneficial implications of banks being
exposed to runs. More recently, some empirical studies analyze the link between deposit
taking and lending. For example, there is evidence from the U.S. that core deposits, i.e.,
deposits with inelastic interest rates, represent an important basis for relationship lending
(Berlin and Mester 1999). Alternative explanations for the coexistence of lending and deposit
taking are based on information or liquidity synergies (e.g., Black 1975; Fama 1985; Kashyap
et al. 2002; Mester et al. 2007; Norden and Weber 2010). Other recent research examines the
role of funding strategies on bank risk and return (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2009;
Huang and Ratnovski 2009).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we propose a set of hypotheses, present
the institutional characteristics of the German banking system, and describe the data. In
Section 3 we outline the empirical method, report our main results for the multivariate
hypothesis tests, and analyze the robustness of our findings. Section 4 concludes.
2 Hypotheses, institutional background, and data
2.1 Hypotheses
We propose four hypotheses on the relation between bank funding modes, bank lending and
bank performance. All four hypotheses are motivated by, and relate to, the question of
whether there are structural changes on the liability side of bank balance sheets and if so,
what the potential consequences are. These changes might result from the interplay between
the growth of bank lending and difficulties in collecting deposits from households. All our
hypotheses refer to the individual bank level, not to the entire banking system. As noted
beforehand, we assume the evolution of deposits as given and analyze its consequences.
This assumption is supported by the structure of the German banking system, in which
there are many banks and bank branches and relatively low interest rates on standard
savings deposits, and also by overall trends in the allocation of savings by households in
Germany. Moreover, this assumption is rooted in the historical evolution of commercial
banking, implying that banks first collect deposits and then lend to firms. Alternatively, it is
possible to assume that loan demand is exogenous, while loan supply is endogenous. Such
an assumption would make all types of banks’ funding modes endogenous and cannot
J Financ Serv Res (2010) 38:69–93 71
explain structural changes between different funding modes over time. Since the latter is the
main objective of our study, we do not make this alternative assumption.
In contrast to their traditional purpose, interbank liabilities might serve not only as a
temporary buffer for asset-liability imbalances, but might also fill structural funding gaps.
However, interbank liabilities can only serve as a resource for some banks, not for the
whole system. In Germany, permanent funding with interbank liabilities seems particularly
attractive for institutions that belong to two-tier systems, such as the savings bank sector or
the cooperative sector. For example, savings banks can rely on borrowing from their
regional group-central banks (Landesbanks) while the Landesbanks rely on bonds,
debentures, and borrowing from other specialized banks as a major source of funding. A
similar two-tier structure applies to the cooperative sector. This reasoning implies that
banks that have difficulty collecting deposits tend to become net interbank borrowers, while
others become net interbank lenders. This trend indicates an increasing degree of vertical
specialization in the banking system. Therefore, we expect a significant negative relation
between changes in interbank liabilities and changes in deposits from customers, especially
at savings banks and credit cooperatives.
H1 (Substitution hypothesis) The growth of interbank liabilities is negatively related to the
growth of deposits from customers.
If a bank cannot compensate for a decline in deposit taking by using other funding
modes, then we expect to find a significant positive relation between changes in deposits
and changes in loans to customers. This situation may hold for a bank which has already
fully drawn down its credit lines in the interbank market or from the group-central bank and
no longer has sufficient borrowing capacity. Consequently, under the “bottleneck
hypothesis,” funding problems translate directly into lending problems, i.e., the bank is
forced to grow at a slower rate or, in the extreme case, to reduce lending. Alternatively, a
bank might respond to funding problems by reconfiguring its asset-side structure. Under the
bottleneck hypothesis, we should not observe a reconfiguration of the asset structure, but a
negative impact on lending. Given the two-tier structure of the savings banks and
cooperative sector, we expect that it is less likely to observe a bottleneck for savings banks
and credit cooperatives, because, unlike commercial banks, savings banks and credit
cooperatives rely on funding from group-central banks.
H2 (Bottleneck hypothesis) The growth of lending to customers is positively related to the
growth of deposits from customers.
Furthermore, a decline of deposits may lower a bank’s net interest result (e.g.,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2009). In Germany, interest expenses on deposits from
customers tend to be lower than interest paid on interbank liabilities.1 Therefore, the net
interest income of a bank might be reduced if a decrease in deposits from customers is
offset by an increase in wholesale funding. This is because the new funding mix, given a
particular asset structure, will result in higher interest expenses. This reasoning only holds if
the deposits that decline in importance bear lower interest rates than do the interbank
liabilities. Most important, compared to funds borrowed from group-central banks or other
1 Deposits from customers are generally considered as a relatively cheap funding mode (e.g., Ianotta et al.
2007; Dinger and von Hagen 2005; Gilkeson et al. 1999).
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banks at money-market rates, this condition is met for the savings deposits that represent
the key source of funding of savings banks.
H3 (Performance impact) Changes of the net interest income are positively related to the
growth of deposits from customers.
Finally, we assume that a bank’s net position with customers will have a significant
impact on its net interbank position. We define surplus banks as institutions in which
deposits from customers exceed loans to customers, and deficit banks as those banks in
which loans to customers exceed deposits from customers. Given this imbalance in lending
and deposit taking opportunities, deficit banks partially use funding from other banks to
take fully advantage of their lending potential. If it becomes economy-wide more difficult
to gather deposits from households, which is by definition harder for deficit banks than for
surplus banks, deficit banks face a stronger need for alternative funding modes because they
are more likely to maintain their lending volume than surplus banks. Such a situation might
be more realistic for deficit banks in the two-tier systems, and would lead to an overall
lengthening of the intermediation chain. A structural change in a bank’s net customer
position, e.g., a decreasing ability to collect deposits, could affect the net interbank position,
non-deposit funding modes, and the corresponding growth rates. Therefore, we expect
stronger effects at deficit banks than at surplus banks.
H4 (Difference between surplus and deficit banks) Changes in funding modes are stronger
at deficit banks than at surplus banks.
2.2 Institutional characteristics of the German banking system
The German banking system is a typical universal banking system (Hackethal 2004;
Brunner et al. 2004; Fitch Ratings 2005). There are three major pillars: private commercial
banks, including the four big banks; state-owned savings banks, including the Landesbanks;
and credit cooperatives, including the cooperative central banks. These three sectors
comprise a large number of legally independent banking firms; although they do not
represent banking groups or bank holding companies, they may include some. The structure
of the banking system reflects the federalist-decentralized structure of the German political
and economic system. Although private commercial banks are very different in terms of
size, geographic coverage, and activity, the savings banks and credit cooperatives sectors
are more homogeneous.
The savings bank sector has a three-layer pyramidal structure. The top layer consists of
one group-central bank that mainly provides the entire savings bank sector with payment,
brokerage, and investment banking services. The intermediate layer comprises 12
Landesbanks that serve as money center banks for savings banks from the same and/or
neighbored regions. The bottom layer comprises roughly 500 savings banks that
traditionally focus on deposit taking and lending. All banks in this sector are state-owned.
The cooperative sector has two layers. The top layer, the cooperative central banks,
consists of two institutions. Like the Landesbanks, the cooperative central banks focus on
commercial and real-estate lending, and serve as money center banks for the credit
cooperatives. The bottom layer, comprising the credit cooperatives, focus on deposit taking
and lending. Because of mergers and acquisitions, their number decreased from more than
3,000 in 1992 to 1,300 in 2002. Cooperative banks are not publicly listed. They are
privately owned by their members.
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In Germany, there is a mandatory “regional principle” for both savings banks and credit
cooperatives. The charters of these banks include a clause that restricts their banking
activities to a specific region, thus avoiding competition with institutions from the same
sector. The regional principle leads to a geographic specialization of the retail institutions.
All banks are subject to federal banking regulations and supervision. Moreover, deposits
at commercial banks are directly insured up to a fixed amount while deposits at savings
banks and credit cooperatives are fully insured by the sector-specific banking associations.
Another distinguishing feature is that less than 1% of all banks are publicly listed.
Furthermore, the banking system is characterized by a large number of banks and their
branches, but only a small number of inhabitants per bank branch. In 2001, there were
1,880 inhabitants per branch, in 2003, 2,113 inhabitants per branch. Therefore, Germany
has often been called “overbanked” and “overbranched” (Deutsche Bundesbank 2002;
Deutsche Bundesbank 2004; Fitch Ratings 2005). The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
for the German banking market is relatively small, indicating a low degree of concentration
(Hempell 2002). However, market concentration statistics should be interpreted carefully:
the degree of concentration is clearly higher at local levels because of the regional principle.
Moreover, Germany faces an increasing intrasector consolidation in the cooperative and
savings bank sector (see, e.g., Elsas 2004). Consequently, the absolute number of
independent banking firms (bank branches) decreased by roughly 43% (25%) between
1992 and 2002. Finally, the savings banks sector is changing, because in July 2005,
European Union law abolished all kinds of public guarantees for savings banks and
Landesbanks, considering them to be illegal state aid. This development unfavorably affects
the funding costs of the Landesbanks because a deterioration of their credit ratings increases
the credit spreads of newly issued bonds and debentures, while savings banks do not face
higher funding costs since they rely on fully insured deposits. However, these institutions
are confronted with an ongoing debate about ownership and governance, risk taking, and
cross-sector or cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Hackethal 2004; Brunner et al. 2004;
Gropp et al. 2009).
2.3 The data
To investigate the evolution of banks’ funding modes, we analyze data for all German
banks, provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The data we use are the bank balance sheet
statistics (publicly available aggregate data, 1970–2002, monthly); bank balance sheet
statistics (not publicly available, anonymous bank-level data, 1992–2002, monthly); and
bank income statement statistics (not publicly available, anonymous bank-level data, 1992–
2002, yearly). Since both balance sheet and income statement statistics reflect the entire
German banking system, we do not have selection problems and sampling errors. Figure 1
displays the evolution of German banks’ funding items relative to total assets over the
period 1970–2002.
It can be seen that the ratio of deposits from customers to total assets declines from
above 50% in the late 1980s to below 40% in the late 1990s. The spike in some curves in
1990 is due to the effects of the German unification. During the period from 1970 to 2002,
deposits from banks rise from 20% to almost 30% of total assets (Ehrmann and Worms
2001). In addition, the share of bonds relative to total assets increases. We note that the
mean equity ratio of German banks has been relatively stable during the entire period (Kleff
and Weber 2008; Heid et al. 2004).
Figure 2 differentiates the evolution of deposits by bank categories. During the 1990s,
there is a clear decrease in deposits from customers relative to total assets for all three bank
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categories, indicating a general trend. Because we calculate the time series in Figs. 1 and 2
as percentages of total assets from the same period, they are not biased by Germany’s
inflation rate. We note that this evolution does not necessarily imply that the absolute stock
of deposits from customers is declining, but does at least indicate that it is growing at a
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Fig. 1 Funding items to total assets of all German banks (in %). The figure shows the time series of
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Fig. 2 Deposits from customers to total assets by bank categories (in %). The figure shows the time series of
aggregate data from the Deutsche Bundesbank for savings banks, credit cooperatives, and big banks during
the period from January 1970 to December 2002
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slower rate than other funding items. In other words, assets of retail banks are increasingly
funded by means other than deposits from customers.
We categorize the variables in our study as funding modes, bank assets, performance
measures, and bank characteristics (see Appendix 1 for definitions). On the one hand,
analyzing percentage changes of absolute balance items has the advantage that the variables
are not technically related to each other. Examining first differences of ratios can create
technical dependencies if we analyze the relation between all variables from the same side
of the balance sheet. Further, changes in ratios may be difficult to interpret, since they are
driven by changes in both the numerator and the denominator. We note that our variable
construction avoids both shortcomings. On the other hand, growth rates refer to levels from
different banks and years. Therefore, to confirm our results, we perform robustness tests
based on first differences of ratios in Section 3.3. Bank characteristics are captured by the
following variables:
(1) PROV represents the net change in loan loss provisions.
(2) EQRAT represents bank capital.
(3) MERGE, is a dummy variable equal to one if a bank acquires another bank in a
particular year.2
(4) EAST is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a bank’s head office is located in
Eastern Germany. This variable coincides with the area of business of savings banks
and credit cooperatives because of the regional principle. However, it does not reflect
the area of business of the big banks because the latter operate nationwide.
(5) CITYSTATE, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bank’s head
office is in the city states of Berlin, Hamburg, or Bremen.3
(6) SIZE represents the log of total assets.
(7) GROWTH represents the growth rate of total assets.
Table 1 reports the cross-sectional means of the percentage changes of absolute balance
sheet items and bank characteristics for all banks. Appendix 2 provides separate tables for
savings banks and credit cooperatives. Panel A includes the variables for all banks by year.
Panel B focuses on the evolution of deposit taking by savings banks and credit cooperatives.
Panel A shows that the mean deposit growth rate (ΔDEP) is lower than the mean growth
rate of interbank liabilities (ΔIBL) in each of the years except 2001 and 2002. The overall
arithmetic mean of ΔDEP is 5.4% (per bank-year observation) and 13.8% (per bank-year
observation) for ΔIBL. When we differentiate by deposit types we find that the evolution of
deposits is heterogeneous. Although time deposits exhibit considerable decreases over
1993–1999, savings deposits increase in the first half of the sampling period and decrease
in the second half. Demand deposits exhibit higher growth rates (9.4%) than do savings
deposits (7.6%) and time deposits (−0.4%).
2 Although most of the bank mergers occur in the cooperative sector, the objectives for mergers are much the
same across banks, i.e., they exploit economies of scale and scope, and credit portfolio restructuring.
Moreover, the overall mean of MERGE is 5.1% for credit cooperatives (maximum: 13.4% in 2000) and 2.6%
for savings banks (maximum: 6.9% in 1994).
3 This variable captures differences between banks with head offices located in some big cities and banks
from the rest of Germany. Differentiating all federal states by the average number of inhabitants per square
kilometer over the sampling period indicates that city states, which have populations of 2,592 inhabitants/
square kilometer, exhibit a more concentrated population than do non-city states, which have populations of
225 inhabitants/square kilometer. We know that other big cities such as Munich, Frankfurt, and Cologne are
not covered. In addition, there is only small number of commercial banks that have their head office in the
city states. Since we do not know the headquarters of each bank inside a federal state, we cannot mark all
large cities, but only those which are federal states.
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On the asset side, we observe a relatively even increase in lending with ΔLOAN ranging
between 6% and 11% in most of the years. The evolution of ΔIBR tends to be irregular: in
some years there are increases in interbank receivables, but decreases in others. In terms of
performance, ΔNIR exhibits a negative sign in seven out of 10 years and a negative mean
growth rate over the sampling period, indicating a general deterioration of German banks’
net interest income (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2001). We
note that the interpretations given above also hold for geometric means of annual growth
rates instead of the arithmetic means shown in the rightmost columns. Panel B confirms
these developments and is consistent with Fig. 2. These results indicate that there is a
considerable fraction of banks in both groups that exhibit negative growth rates in deposits.
Table 1 Summary statistics. This table reports mean percentage changes of absolute balance sheet and
income statement items (Panel A), except ΔNIR and ΔPROV which are measured in percentage points. The
variables are IBL: interbank liabilities, DEP: deposits from customers, DEM: demand deposits, SAV: savings
deposits, TIME: time deposits, BOND: bonds issued by banks, EQRAT: equity over total assets, IBR:
interbank receivables, LOAN: total loans to customers, SEC: security holdings, GROWTH: percentage
change of total assets, NIR: net interest result, PROV: loan loss provisions, SIZE: total assets, EAST:
indicator variable which is one for banks with a head office in eastern Germany, and MERGE: indicator
variable that is one for the acquiring bank in the year of a merger or acquisition. Detailed definitions are
given in Appendix 1. ΔDEP_TA is the first difference in percentage points of the ratio “deposits to total
assets” in each group (Panel B)
Panel A: Variables for all banks by year
Variable 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
ΔIBL 20.7 24.3 17.1 13.4 12.7 14.3 17.5 7.9 0.6 −1.5 13.8
ΔDEP 9.3 6.2 5.9 5.6 3.7 5.7 3.5 1.0 8.3 3.5 5.4
ΔDEM 9.7 8.6 6.6 10.0 4.5 12.7 10.8 5.4 19.6 7.5 9.4
ΔSAV 9.9 15.4 15.5 13.1 6.2 4.9 2.8 −4.2 2.1 1.8 7.6
ΔTIME 7.5 −4.8 −7.5 −9.1 −1.8 2.6 −0.8 5.6 8.7 0.6 −0.4
ΔBOND 20.3 20.7 19.1 5.3 4.5 −2.3 −4.5 2.1 −0.1 2.4 7.6
ΔEQRAT 11.7 11.7 10.1 9.5 7.9 7.8 7.7 8.4 6.5 5.7 8.9
ΔIBR 18.4 −24.1 20.1 −0.1 5.7 10.2 2.6 −11.5 23.8 8.7 4.9
ΔLOAN 9.1 11.7 9.7 7.4 6.3 7.0 6.2 6.3 4.2 2.4 7.4
ΔSEC 15.1 20.7 −1.7 7.4 2.5 4.5 3.8 −0.9 3.5 −0.5 6.1
GROWTH 12.1 9.8 8.7 7.3 5.8 7.6 11.4 4.5 8.5 4.5 8.2
ΔNIR 0.0 0.1 −0.1 −0.0 −0.1 −0.2 −0.0 −0.0 −0.1 0.1 −0.1
ΔPROVt 0.3 0.2 −0.2 0.0 0.1 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1
SIZE 11.8 11.9 12.0 12.1 12.1 12.2 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.1
EAST 10.5 9.5 8.6 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 8.9
MERGE 3.3 3.8 2.5 2.6 2.6 4.3 6.2 7.7 6.6 – 3.7
# of banks 3,866 3,701 3,616 3,508 3,415 3,232 2,993 2,733 2,518 2,419 2,294
Panel B: Evolution of deposits at savings banks and credit cooperatives by year
Group Variable 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Mean
Savings banks ΔDEP 7.3 6.5 6.4 5.6 3.6 4.2 2.3 −0.1 6.9 2.1 4.6
Δ(other liab.) 15.8 22.5 14.2 11.2 10.2 9.6 11.9 9.5 −0.7 −0.7 10.7
ΔDEP_TA −1.8 −2.6 −1.5 −1.1 −1.2 −0.9 −1.8 −2.0 1.2 0.2 −1.2
% of ΔDEP < 0 0.3 11.9 8.4 5.4 13.4 6.1 31.5 62.4 3.2 29.6 16.9
Coope-ratives ΔDEP 9.4 6.4 5.8 5.4 3.6 5.8 3.7 1.5 8.7 4.2 5.5
Δ(other liab.) 21.1 23.9 18.8 11.7 11.5 13.1 14.8 7.6 1.1 0.2 13.6
ΔDEP_TA −1.2 −1.8 −1.4 −0.7 −1.0 −0.7 −1.4 −1.2 1.2 0.2 −0.9
% of ΔDEP < 0 2.4 10.2 8.2 9.4 23.1 15.0 42.3 70.1 6.4 32.2 19.9
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To test H4, we calculate the yearly net deposit position of each bank. We note that the
surplus and deficit banks switch their net position very infrequently, indicating a robust
classification over time. To check the robustness of our results, instead of the year-specific
net deposit position we use the mean and median net deposit position over the full sample
period to define surplus and deficit banks, which excludes the possibility that banks switch
between categories, and obtain similar results.
In the group of credit cooperatives, the relative frequencies are 52% for surplus banks
and 48% for deficit banks. In contrast, there are only 12% surplus banks but 88% deficit
banks in the savings banks sector. Based on this information, we examine the link between
a bank’s net customer position and its interbank position. We find that the net customer
position, LOAN minus DEP, is significant and negatively related to its net interbank
position. The correlation ranges between −0.70 for savings banks and credit cooperatives
and −0.63 for all other banks. Probit models with the net interbank position as a dependent
variable and the net customer position and various bank characteristics as explanatory
variables, confirm our findings from the univariate correlation analysis. We obtain
qualitatively similar results if we analyze the relation between changes of the net positions.
These findings imply that the interbank position follows from imbalances in the retail
business. The relation between the net customer position and the net interbank position is
more pronounced for savings banks and credit cooperatives because they benefit from
special relationships with group-central banks.
Our analysis indicates a structural change in the funding structure of retail banks in
Germany. It is remarkable that at some banks, deposits from customers are no longer as
important for funding as in former times. This change has also taken place in other large
countries.
3 Analyzing the impact of declining deposit growth
3.1 Method
To test H1, we analyze how the growth rate of interbank liabilities relates to growth rates of
various other funding modes. We control for the individual bank characteristics MERGEt,
EASTt, CITYSTATEt, SIZEt, and GROWTH, because we include growth rates of absolute
balance sheet items and not ratios. We also add year dummy variables to control for
macroeconomic effects and time series trends, using 1993 as our reference year. We cannot
include bank-individual loan and deposit interest rates because there is no such micro data
set for German banks. The alternative, i.e., calculating average interest rates from interest
expenses/income and loan/deposit volume, would be imprecise, because it would presume
the same level of interest rates for all kinds of deposits.
According to H1, the growth of interbank liabilities should be negatively related to the
growth of deposits from customers in Model 1, that is β2<0. In all models, we substitute
ΔDEP with ΔDEM, ΔSAV, and ΔTIME to test whether the hypothesis holds for different
types of deposits and bank groups. We also include changes in the volume of issued bonds
(ΔBOND) and the growth of interbank receivables (ΔIBR) to take into account the
evolution of a bank’s net interbank position.
$IBLit ¼ a þ b1$IBRit þ b2$DEPit þ b3$BONDit þ dBank characteristicsit
þ mYear dummiest þ "it ð1Þ
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To test H2, we analyze the impact of changes in interbank receivables, security holdings,
and various funding modes on changes in lending to customers. To do so, we use theModel 2.
If the bottleneck described by H2 exists, then we would expect a significantly positive
coefficient β3 but no significant coefficients β1, β2, β4 and β5 in Model 2. If β1 or β2 are
significantly negative and/or β4 or β5 are significantly positive, then a bank’s loan growth
is also funded by an asset reconfiguration and/or by non-deposit funding modes, i.e., there
is no bottleneck. We cannot carry out a conditional analysis that differentiates between
constrained and unconstrained banks because of data limitations. Nonetheless, the
aggregate findings for each of the groups have implications for the general importance of
this effect.
$LOANit ¼ a þ b1$IBRit þ b2$SECit þ b3$DEPit þ b4$IBLit þ b5$BONDit
þ dBank characteristicsit þ mYear dummiest þ "it ð2Þ
H3 suggests that a decline of deposits affects a bank’s interest income unfavorably.
Therefore, we test whether changes in the funding structure, i.e., the change of the ratio of
deposits to interbank liabilities, ΔDEP_IBL, affect changes in the net interest income. To
do so, we control for simultaneous changes of the asset structure (ΔLOAN_IBR). If the
estimation yields a significantly positive coefficient β1, then our empirical results
corroborate H3. In addition, we expect the coefficients β2 and β3 to be significantly
positive. We note that the explanatory variables in this model indicate structural changes on
the liability and asset side, because they measure the change in the reciprocal importance of
two variables.
$NIRit ¼ a þ b1$DEP IBLit þ b2$DEP BONDit þ b3$LOAN IBRit
þ dBank characteristicsit þ mYear dummiest þ "it ð3Þ
with
ΔDEP IBLt ¼ DEPt=IBLtð Þ  DEPt1=IBLt1ð Þ
ΔDEP BONDt ¼ DEPt=BONDtð Þ  DEPt1=BONDt1ð Þ
ΔLOAN IBRt ¼ LOANt=IBRtð Þ  LOANt1=IBRt1ð Þ:
We test H4 by using univariate Wilcoxon rank sum tests and separately re-estimating
Models 1–3 for surplus and deficit banks.
3.2 Results
For Models 1–3, we present results from separate cross-sectional time-series pooled
estimations for commercial banks, savings banks, and credit cooperatives.4
Table 2 includes results from the estimation of Model 1.
The table shows that DEMt, ΔSAVt, ΔTIMEt are significant and negatively related to
changes in interbank liabilities at savings banks and credit cooperatives. The effect is
strongest for savings deposits in both groups. We also find a negative coefficient for
ΔTIMEt at commercial banks. In terms of goodness-of-fit, the model explains the structural
relations for savings banks and credit cooperatives well, and almost as well for commercial
banks. These findings represent strong support for H1 for savings banks and credit
4 We also estimate the corresponding fixed and random effects panel models, but do not show the results as
they yield outcomes similar to those reported here.
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cooperatives, and partially for commercial banks. Moreover, ΔBONDt is significantly and
negatively related to ΔIBLt but the economic magnitude of the link is much smaller than in
the case of deposits from customers. However, the coefficient ofΔIBRt is not significant, i.e.,
banks do not simultaneously increase interbank credits and deposits. Instead, a decline in
deposits is balanced by an increase in interbank liabilities.
Furthermore, considering the control variables, the coefficient of MERGEt is highly
significant for savings banks and credit cooperatives, since most of all bank mergers in
Germany happened in these groups. There are various explanations for the negative
coefficient of MERGE. This finding is consistent with the fact that the interbank liabilities
of the acquirer may be diluted because the target has a smaller volume of interbank
liabilities. Moreover, acquiring banks might reduce borrowing from other banks precisely
because they get external cash inflows, as well as to comply with regulatory capital
requirements when implementing a takeover. The indicator variable EAST is significantly
negative for savings banks and credit cooperatives, and significantly positive in case of
commercial banks. These results suggest that the reliance on interbank liabilities is smaller
for savings banks and credit cooperatives in eastern Germany compared to the same banks
in western Germany but the commercial banks in eastern Germany clearly rely more on
wholesale funding. The coefficient of CITYSTATE is not significant in any of the three
regressions, indicating that if we compare banks from some big cities with the rest of
Table 2 Regression results for interbank liabilities (ΔIBL). Results are based on a cross-sectional time-series
pooled estimation with data from the period 1993–2002. The dependent variable is the percentage change of a
bank’s absolute volume of interbank liabilities. Explanatory variables are percentage changes in the absolute
volume of interbank receivables, funding modes, and control variables. All regressions include year dummies with
1993 as reference year, which are not shown here. We take into account the clustering of observations at the bank
level and report p-values calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors
Dep. Var.: ΔIBLt Commercial banks Savings banks Credit cooperatives
Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val.
Interbank credits
ΔIBRt 0.1015 0.522 0.0032 0.109 0.0052 0.308
Funding modes
ΔDEMt −0.0922 0.162 −0.6648 0.000*** −0.3682 0.000***
ΔSAVt −0.0431 0.173 −1.1879 0.000*** −1.0102 0.000***
ΔTIMEt −0.1907 0.002*** −0.5260 0.000*** −0.7855 0.000***
ΔBONDt 0.0061 0.842 −0.0371 0.000*** −0.0621 0.000***
Controls
MERGEt 8.9542 0.409 −5.7414 0.001*** −10.9932 0.000***
EAST 25.0854 0.002*** −5.7509 0.000*** −5.2968 0.000***
CITYSTATE −2.6967 0.316 0.8499 0.172 8.5237 0.309
SIZEt 1.0697 0.079* −0.2337 0.338 0.3058 0.446
GROWTHt 1.1454 0.002*** 3.6731 0.000*** 3.5862 0.000***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant −12.2727 0.304 12.6590 0.000*** −12.8033 0.015**
Obs. 745 5,141 10,397
R2 0.1033 0.6542 0.3164
***, **, * indicate coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level
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Germany, then the relation between deposits and interbank liabilities is not different, i.e.,
the variable cannot sharply discriminate between urban and rural areas. SIZEt is positively
related to changes in interbank liabilities at commercial banks, but not for the two other
groups. This result indicates stronger cross-sectional differences in the group of commercial
banks compared to small local banks. GROWTHt is significantly positive in all groups,
showing that an increase in total assets is at least partially funded by an increase in
interbank liabilities. Our analysis shows that there is a significantly negative relation
between all kinds of deposits from customers and interbank liabilities for savings banks and
credit cooperatives, but not for commercial banks.
An alternative explanation for these findings could be based on the link between the
“regional principle” and regional economic activity. The “regional principle” prescribes a
particular geographic area in which savings banks are allowed to operate. It also applies to
credit cooperatives. Therefore, regional economic activity might lead to a higher share of
surplus than deficit banks in certain areas because of the heterogeneous regional patterns of
households and industrial clusters. This point is a major difference between these banks and
commercial banks since the latter are not subject to geographic constraints.
However, there are several arguments against this alternative explanation. We document
a clear decline in deposit taking in all three groups (savings banks, credit cooperatives, and
big banks), as shown by Fig. 2. This result rules out that increasing difficulties in
mobilizing deposits are due to geographic constraints for savings banks. Moreover, we find
an increase in interbank liabilities at the vast majority of savings banks, indicating a general
effect and the importance of the two-tier structure within this sector. We obtain significant
coefficients for the funding mode variables in the savings banks and cooperative sector
although we include the variables EAST and CITYSTATE in all our regression analyses to
control for differences in regional economic activity. In unreported analyses by federal
state, we confirm that the uncovered structural changes are not unique to certain regions.
Furthermore, the distribution of regional economic activity in Germany is relatively
homogenous, and, unlike banks’ funding modes, it has not much changed over time in the
western part of Germany.
Thus, our results support H1 and are consistent with the importance of the two-tier
structure for interbank activities in the savings banks and cooperative sector.
The findings on our test of H2 by using Model 2 are shown in Table 3.
We obtain two main results. First, that the growth rates of interbank receivables (ΔIBRt)
and security holdings (ΔSECt) are significantly and negatively associated with loan growth
(ΔLOANt) for all three groups, providing evidence that there are substitution relations
between bank assets.
Second, the growth rates of savings deposits (ΔSAVt) and interbank liabilities (ΔIBLt)
have a significantly positive impact on loan growth at savings banks and credit
cooperatives. For time deposits, we obtain a significantly positive coefficient only for
savings banks. In other words, both deposit taking and borrowing from other banks fund
lending to customers. However, demand deposits that are mainly held for payment purposes
have no significant impact in either group. In addition, another funding mode, ΔBONDt, is
significantly positive for commercial banks and credit cooperatives.
When we examine the control variables, we find that changes of the capital ratio are
significantly and positively related to ΔLOANt at savings banks and credit cooperatives.
Banks must increase their equity if they intend to increase lending and still maintain the
same internal and/or regulatory capital ratio. One explanation for why we find a significant
effect only for savings banks and credit cooperatives is that these banks are more
constrained, because to increase equity, they must retain earnings. This constraint leads to a
J Financ Serv Res (2010) 38:69–93 81
relatively strong relation between changes of the capital ratio and lending. In addition,
ΔPROVt displays a positive coefficient for savings banks and credit cooperatives,
indicating that an increase of loan loss provisioning goes hand in hand with an increase
in lending. Moreover, MERGEt, and especially EASTt, exhibit a positive impact on loan
growth. However, unlike the results in Table 2, CITYSTATE is now highly significant and
positive for savings banks and credit cooperatives. This result shows that loan growth at
these banks is higher in large cities compared to the rest of Germany, despite the fact that
we cannot perfectly discriminate between urban and rural areas. The consistently negative
coefficient of SIZEt indicates that larger banks exhibit a lower growth of loans to
customers. GROWTHt has a significantly positive impact on ΔLOANt, which is also
economically significant.
Although we find that ΔSAVt, and partly ΔTIMEt, have a positive influence on loan
growth, we cannot conclude that these empirical findings provide support for H2. Such a
conclusion would ignore the fact that there is a significantly negative link between growth
rates of banks assets (ΔLOANt compared to ΔIBRt or ΔSECt) and a significantly positive
Table 3 Regression results for loans to customers (ΔLOAN). Results are based on a cross-sectional time-
series pooled estimation with data from the period 1993–2002. The dependent variable is the percentage
change of a bank’s absolute volume of loans to customers. Explanatory variables are percentage changes in
the absolute volume of bank assets, funding modes, and control variables. All regressions include year
dummies with 1993 as reference year, which are not shown here. We take into account the clustering of
observations at the bank level and report p-values calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors
Dep. Var.: ΔLOANt Commercial banks Savings banks Credit cooperatives
Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val.
Bank assets
ΔIBRt −0.1325 0.000*** −0.0219 0.000*** −0.0402 0.000***
ΔSECt −0.0706 0.003*** −0.0762 0.000*** −0.0575 0.000***
Funding modes
ΔIBLt 0.0036 0.812 0.0171 0.010*** 0.0099 0.000***
ΔDEMt −0.0004 0.984 −0.0045 0.544 0.0001 0.973
ΔSAVt 0.0147 0.209 0.0657 0.000*** 0.0218 0.012**
ΔTIMEt 0.0443 0.186 0.0116 0.078* −0.0073 0.231
ΔBONDt 0.0399 0.079* 0.0027 0.128 0.0034 0.000***
Controls
ΔEQRATt 0.8081 0.284 3.8223 0.000*** 1.7617 0.000***
ΔPROVt −0.7580 0.254 0.6031 0.001*** 0.8523 0.000***
MERGEt 9.7767 0.074* 1.1568 0.153 0.7594 0.000***
EAST −5.9589 0.088* 2.7861 0.000*** 1.1112 0.053*
CITYSTATE 1.4478 0.212 1.9571 0.000*** 1.2961 0.017**
SIZEt −0.5747 0.089* −0.2532 0.000*** −0.1682 0.002***
GROWTHt 0.8854 0.000*** 1.9451 0.000*** 1.0355 0.000***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.5821 0.442 5.2464 0.000*** 1.1982 0.086*
Obs. 742 5,139 10,395
R2 0.4681 0.8495 0.8663
*** , **, * indicate coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level
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influence of ΔIBL and ΔBONDt on loan growth. Thus, even if deposits are declining in
relative importance, banks have two further options to avoid a reduction in lending. They
can reconfigure the asset side, which seems to be the typical reaction of commercial banks.
Or, in a reaction that is typical for savings banks and credit cooperatives, banks can rely
increasingly on non-deposit funding modes to fill the funding gap. Given these results, we
must reject Hypothesis H2. We do not observe a bottleneck effect, because there is no
negative impact on lending due to a decline of deposits from customers.
To test H3, we investigate if and how structural changes in funding modes affect bank
profitability as measured by changes of the ratio of net interest income to total assets,
calculated before write-offs, depreciation, and loan loss provisions. Given the context of
this study, we focus on the net interest result because this measure depends on a bank’s
funding mix, ceteris paribus. We control for the influence of default risk on loan rates and
the net interest result by including the change in loan loss provisions (ΔPROV).
Table 4 shows that the ratio of deposits from customers to interbank liabilities
(ΔDEP_IBLt) has a highly significant and positive influence on the ΔNIRt of savings
banks. In other words, the higher the share of deposits from customers relative to interbank
liabilities, the more profitable a savings bank.5
We find qualitatively the same evidence for credit cooperatives, but the effect is weaker
in terms of statistical and economic significance. Moreover, changes of the ratio of loans to
customers to interbank receivables (ΔLOAN_IBRt) exhibit a significantly positive impact
on ΔNIRt for all bank groups. This effect is strongest for commercial banks and lowest for
savings banks. One explanation for this finding may be that because commercial banks
have a more risk-sensitive loan pricing policy, they benefit from higher margins in loan
rates than do savings banks. Furthermore, for credit cooperatives, structural shifts between
deposits and bonds (ΔDEP_BONDt) have a significant, but small, profitability impact.
Among the control variables, ΔPROV displays a significantly positive coefficient in all
three groups. If a bank faces an increase of the default risk in lending (for which we use the
increase in loan loss provisions as our proxy), then loan rates will go up as well but deposit
rates will typically exhibit either a very slow increase or no increase at all. This effect
explains the short-run increase in the net interest result. The coefficient of MERGEt is
significantly positive for all groups and ranges from 0.11 to 0.36. This result indicates an
additional net interest income for the acquirer in the year of a takeover. Alternatively,
acquiring banks might have funded the transaction with liquid assets that are replaced by a
more profitable loan portfolio, increasing the relative net interest result. The variables
EASTt (for savings banks and credit cooperatives only) and GROWTHt display a
significantly negative coefficient, but CITYSTATEt has no significant influence. SIZEt
has a negative coefficient for savings banks and credit cooperatives, which indicates the
higher share of expensive wholesale funding relative to less expensive deposits from
customers at large banks in these groups, and a weakly positive coefficient for commercial
banks, which might be due to the higher loan margins realized by these banks.
Consistent with Hackethal (2004), we find evidence in favor of H3 for German savings
banks and a weaker but still significant effect for credit cooperatives: a decrease in deposits
5 However, this finding holds only for the net interest result, not for the overall profitability of savings banks.
In general, there may be two contrarian effects. On the one hand, it is plausible to assume that a savings bank
pushes its customers to invest, for example, in mutual funds to generate income that may reduce the growth
of deposits. On the other hand, if the same bank has a steady growth in loan demand, it must find alternative
funding modes that might turn out to be more expensive than the previous ones. We also note that during our
sampling period, the average net interest result of savings banks is five times larger than the net non-interest
result.
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from customers is compensated for by an increase in interbank borrowing, which
unfavorably affects the net interest result. We note that our regression results are based
on data from 1992–1993, which were years with relatively high interest rates and an inverse
term structure that is shifting to a normal one, as well as years with relatively low interest
rates and a normal term structure. The year dummies, which are not shown in Table 4,
exhibit significantly negative coefficients for savings banks and credit cooperatives in
nearly all of the years. Accordingly, a decrease of the interest income from security
holdings may be an additional explanation for the observed decrease of the net interest
income. The significance and the magnitude of the year dummies reflect the different
impact of the level and term structure of interest rates on each group that is caused by
different asset and funding structures.
We empirically test H4 by adding another dimension, the net deposit position with
customers to our analysis. Table 5 reports the median growth rates of funding modes and
bank assets for deficit and surplus banks by group, as well as results from nonparametric
rank sum tests.
The analysis in Table 5 provides additional insights. First, demand deposits grow
steadily at relative high rates in all groups and they do not differ significantly between
surplus and deficit banks. Hence, demand deposits are not in general decline and represent a
relatively stable source of funds. Second, that in both groups the growth of savings and time
Table 4 Regression results for the net interest result (ΔNIR). Results are based on a cross-sectional time-
series pooled estimation with data from the period 1993–2002. The dependent variable is the change of a
bank’s net interest result (relative to total assets). Explanatory variables are changes in the ratio of deposits-
to-interbank liabilities, deposits-to-bonds, loans to customers-to-interbank receivables, and control variables.
All regressions include year dummies with 1993 as reference year, which are not shown here. We take into
account the clustering of observations at the bank level and report p-values calculated from Huber-White
robust standard errors
ΔNIRt Commercial banks Savings banks Credit cooperatives
Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val.
Funding modes
ΔDEP_IBLt −0.0092 0.622 0.1212 0.000*** 0.0286 0.068*
ΔDEP_BONDt 0.0070 0.618 −0.0029 0.582 0.0087 0.017**
Bank assets
ΔLOAN_IBRt 0.0658 0.020** 0.0172 0.000*** 0.0356 0.000***
Controls
ΔPROVt 0.0373 0.060* 0.0644 0.000*** 0.0661 0.000***
MERGEt 0.3618 0.000*** 0.1111 0.000*** 0.1182 0.000***
EAST −0.0113 0.919 −0.0305 0.001*** −0.0562 0.000***
CITYSTATE 0.0069 0.741 0.0019 0.898 −0.0228 0.241
SIZEt 0.0107 0.060* −0.0098 0.010*** −0.0175 0.000***
GROWTHt −0.0094 0.000*** −0.0030 0.002*** −0.0027 0.000***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.1074 0.824 0.2119 0.000*** 0.3689 0.000***
Obs. 1,214 5,141 10,397
R2 0.3907 0.3870 0.2473
***, **, * indicate coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level
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deposits is consistently lower at deficit banks than at surplus banks. The growth rates of
time deposits even have a negative sign at savings banks and credit cooperatives with a
funding deficit. Third, the analysis shows that the growth rates of interbank liabilities are
significantly higher at deficit banks than at surplus banks. For example, it is 11.03% at
savings banks with a deposit deficit compared to 7.83% at savings banks with a deposit
surplus while the opposite is consistently found for interbank receivables. These findings
represent direct evidence in favor of H4 because changes in deposit taking and interbank
activities are stronger at deficit banks than at surplus banks. The difference between surplus
and deficit banks is statistically and economically significant for growth rates of savings
and time deposits, but there is no such difference in demand deposits, indicating that the
function of deposits matters.
We also examine the question of if and how institutional features in the three sectors of
the German banking system matter, and specifically whether the way in which retail banks
respond to the decline in deposit taking relates to the organizational structure of the three
sectors. Two important features that differentiate the savings banks and cooperative sector
from commercial banks are the regional principle and the two-tier structure. Most of
Germany’s commercial banks, particularly the big banks, operate nationwide and do not
have group-central banks. Thus, we compare whether the evolution of the net interbank
position differs between the savings banks sector and the big banks.
Figure 3 illustrates two important findings. First, that the absolute net interbank position
of savings banks, which is defined by the black line, and Landesbanks, the dark gray line,
are negatively related, indicating that savings banks partially compensate for the decline in
deposit taking by borrowing from Landesbanks. The correlation of the time series in Fig. 3
is −0.86. We obtain a similar value if we compare the ratio of the net interbank position
over total assets for savings banks and Landesbanks. Second, that the net interbank position
of big banks, depicted by the light gray line, which operate nationwide and have no
particular money center bank in their sector, develops in a way that is similar to that of
savings banks. This finding indicates that all retail banks respond to the decline in deposit
taking by either reducing interbank lending and/or increasing interbank borrowing. Thus,
the type of the reaction of retail banks is not only a consequence of sector-specific
institutional features such as the regional principle and the existence of group-central banks.
Table 5 Comparison of banks’ funding modes and assets by net deposit position. This table reports changes
in funding modes and bank assets for savings banks and credit cooperatives differentiated by the net deposit
position, i.e., deficit banks compared to surplus banks
Net deposit position Savings banks Credit cooperatives
Deficit Surplus Deficit Surplus
Funding modes
ΔDEM 6.68 6.64 7.16 7.31
ΔSAV 4.16 7.68*** 5.04 7.16***
ΔTIME −2.21 0.19*** −2.19 −0.78***
ΔIBL 11.03 7.83*** 10.73 8.55***
Bank assets
ΔIBR 2.29 9.88*** −1.48 10.14***
ΔLOAN 5.43 6.03** 6.04 5.64***
*** , **, * indicate significant differences at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level based on a non-parametric
Wilcoxon rank sum test
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The figure also shows that there is a structural change, in the sense that interbank funding
has gained considerably in importance since the early to mid 1990s. These findings are
consistent with the view that we observe an increasing specialization between retail banks
and wholesale banks, which lengthens the intermediation chain within the banking sector.
3.3 Tests of robustness
To study the robustness of our results, we first re-estimate Models 1–3 with balance-sheet
items deflated by the German CPI and GDP, i.e., with real variables. We note that the
impact of inflation during 1992–2002 is low, since the results from the estimation with
deflated variables are similar. Since neither the significance nor the signs of all coefficients
change, and because the magnitude of the coefficients varies in a small range of ±0.02, we
do not report details here.
Second, to check whether the results are not driven by our measurement technique, we
use a different way to transform the data. Instead of taking the percentage changes of
absolute balance sheet items, we repeat the multivariate tests of H1 and H2 with first
differences of ratios to shed further light on the substitution patterns. We do not repeat the
test of H3, because this analysis is already carried out in first differences. Table 6 summarizes
the estimation results. In Table 6, Panel A corresponds to Table 2 and Panel B to Table 3.
In Table 6, Panel A confirms our previous results for H1 for savings banks and credit
cooperatives. The coefficients of the funding modes are significantly negative and slightly
below one for these banks, indicating close substitution patterns. In contrast to Table 2, the
same coefficients for commercial banks are now significantly negative, but the R2 of the
regression model is substantially lower compared to the other groups. The main reason for
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Fig. 3 Absolute net interbank position by bank type (in billion EUR). The figure shows the time series of
aggregate from the Deutsche Bundesbank for big banks, Landesbanks, and savings banks during the period
from January 1970 to December 2002. The net interbank position is defined as the difference between
interbank lending and borrowing
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Table 6 Regression results based on balance sheet ratios. Results are based on a cross-sectional time-series
pooled estimation with data from the period 1993–2002. The dependent variables are first differences of
interbank liabilities-to-total assets (Panel A) and loans-to-total assets (Panel B). Explanatory variables are
first differences of bank asset and funding mode ratios and control variables. Regressions include year
dummies with 1993 as reference year, which are not shown here. We consider the clustering of observations
at the bank level and report p-values calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors
Dep. Var.: ΔIBL_TAt Commercial banks Savings banks Credit cooperatives
Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val.
Panel A: Results for interbank liabilities relative to total assets (ΔIBL_TAt)
Interbank credits
ΔIBR_TAt 0.1242 0.001*** 0.0048 0.258 0.0094 0.003***
Funding modes
ΔDEM_TAt −0.7761 0.000*** −0.9694 0.000*** −0.8777 0.000***
ΔSAV_TAt −0.7569 0.000*** −0.9776 0.000*** −0.8916 0.000***
ΔTIME_TAt −0.7089 0.000*** −0.9379 0.000*** −0.8755 0.000***
ΔBOND_TAt −0.7440 0.000*** −0.9481 0.000*** −0.8965 0.000***
Controls
MERGEt −2.7991 0.057* −0.3312 0.011** −0.4513 0.000***
EAST −0.2368 0.899 −0.3938 0.000*** −0.0033 0.907
CITYSTATE 0.1674 0.506 0.1821 0.119 0.5200 0.226
SIZEt 0.0143 0.739 0.1005 0.314 −0.0231 0.055*
GROWTHt 0.0998 0.000*** 0.0113 0.001*** 0.0143 0.000***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.9827 0.170 −0.2349 0.104 −0.2289 0.110
Obs. 745 5,141 10,397
R2 0.5130 0.8974 0.8452
Panel B: Results for loans to customers relative to total assets (ΔLOAN_TAt)
Bank assets
ΔIBR_TAt −0.7685 0.000*** −0.7358 0.000*** −0.8097 0.000***
ΔSEC_TAt −0.7243 0.000*** −0.7387 0.000*** −0.8116 0.000***
Funding modes
ΔIBL_TAt 0.5228 0.000*** 0.1899 0.000*** 0.3697 0.000***
ΔDEM_TAt 0.5552 0.000*** 0.2008 0.000*** 0.3159 0.000***
ΔSAV_TAt 0.3922 0.000*** 0.2492 0.000*** 0.3543 0.000***
ΔTIME_TAt 0.5604 0.000*** 0.2341 0.000*** 0.3317 0.000***
ΔBOND_TAt 0.4704 0.000*** 0.2761 0.000*** 0.3586 0.000***
Controls
ΔEQRATt 0.5042 0.000*** 0.6314 0.000*** 0.2136 0.019**
ΔPROVt 0.0518 0.651 0.2788 0.000*** 0.0998 0.051*
MERGEt 1.4696 0.099* 0.0026 0.988 0.1037 0.067*
EAST 0.7062 0.488 1.1596 0.000*** 1.3488 0.000***
CITYSTATE 0.1347 0.418 0.4863 0.000*** 0.0827 0.398
SIZEt −0.0607 0.095* −0.0567 0.000*** −0.0308 0.000***
GROWTHt −0.0199 0.031** 0.0062 0.184 −0.0044 0.012**
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
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these findings is that bank size varies a lot for commercial banks and very little for the other
groups. Therefore, normalizing the changes in funding modes by total assets leads to
different results for these banks. Moreover, beyond the cross-sectional variation in bank
size, commercial banks are also more likely to issue bonds, and to specialize in wholesale
banking and in mortgage lending. Thus, they might begin to consider traditional deposit
taking as a secondary business, which leads to a less pronounced substitution patterns for
this group.
In Panel B, there are significantly negative coefficients for interbank receivables and
security holdings, but positive coefficients for the interbank liabilities and deposit items.
Similar to the analysis in Table 3, these results represent no support for H2 because we
observe a strong negative link on the asset side in all groups, indicating substitution effects
that offset the positive link between deposit taking and lending.
Third, to test for intertemporal dependencies and endogeneity problems between
balance-sheet items, we include lags of the dependent and explanatory variables in the
models. The estimation leads to slightly higher values for the adjusted R2 for all models.
For Model 1, the coefficients of ΔDEMt, ΔSAVt, ΔTIMEt, and ΔBONDt do not change in
terms of significance and only a little in magnitude, indicating a robust negative impact on
ΔIBLt. Moreover, ΔDEMt-1 and ΔSAVt-1 do not exhibit significant coefficients for either
group. For ΔTIMEt-1, we obtain positive but economically small coefficients for savings
banks and credit cooperatives that are significant at the 1% level. For Model 2, if we
include lags of the dependent and explanatory variables, then we find estimation results for
the impact on ΔLOANt similar to those in Table 3. The coefficients of ΔIBLt-1 at savings
banks and credit cooperatives are significantly positive, showing that in these groups, loan
growth is partially funded by an increase in interbank liabilities. This finding is additional
evidence against the bottleneck theory in H2. When we test Model 3, we confirm our main
finding that the coefficient of ΔDEP_IBLt has a strong positive impact on ΔNIRt for savings
banks. In addition, we find a significantly positive but economically small coefficient of
ΔDEP_IBLt-1 for savings banks and credit cooperatives, which further supports H3. Thus,
we conclude that our basic models are robust to the consideration of intertemporal
dependencies because our main findings hold in an extended model specification.
Finally, we re-estimate Models 1–3 for deficit and surplus banks separately. Doing so
makes it possible for us to study the robustness of previous findings for H4. For Model 1,
we obtain a far better fit for deficit banks (R2=0.59) than for surplus banks (R2=0.26). This
result is consistent with the highest R2 for savings banks for Model 1, because this sector
exhibits the highest share of deficit banks. Moreover, the coefficient of ΔSAVt becomes
significantly negative for commercial banks with funding deficits. For Model 2, we do not
find noteworthy differences to the basic model estimation results shown in Table 3. Our
re-estimation of Model 3 for deficit banks uncovers a significantly positive impact of
ΔDEP_IBLt on ΔNIRt in all groups. For surplus banks, the same coefficient is significant
Table 6 (continued)
Dep. Var.: ΔIBL_TAt Commercial banks Savings banks Credit cooperatives
Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val.
Constant 0.5566 0.401 1.5348 0.000*** 0.4821 0.000***
Obs. 742 5,139 10,395
R2 0.7091 0.7589 0.8049
***, **, * indicate coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level
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and positive only for savings banks. These results are different from our earlier findings
for H3: we observe a negative impact of changes of deposits on the net interest result at
deficit banks in all groups. However, for savings banks, the impact exists even at surplus
banks. This finding corroborates the evidence for H3 reported in Section 3.2. We note that
these results for Germany are consistent with the findings on bank profitability in Eastern
Europe (Dinger and von Hagen 2005).
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the structural changes in banks’ funding modes and the
implications for lending to customers and the effect on bank profitability. Our empirical
evidence is based on a micro data set for all German banks that we obtain from the
Deutsche Bundesbank for the period 1992–2002.
First, we find that growth of interbank liabilities is negatively related to the growth of
deposits from customers at savings banks and credit cooperatives. The effect is strongest at
savings banks. Thus, we provide empirical evidence for a structural change on the liability
side of these banks’ balance sheets. This finding indicates an increasing specialization of
retail and wholesale banks in the same sector, and it is consistent with an overall
lengthening of the intermediation chain and with financial deepening of the economy (King
and Levine 1993). Banks facing a funding deficit become net interbank borrowers, while
others that benefit from a stable funding surplus become net interbank lenders.
Second, we do not detect a negative impact of the relative decline in deposits on lending
to customers. Instead, lending slightly gains in relative importance over time.
Third, the decreasing ability of banks to collect deposits from customers and the
substitution of deposits by interbank liabilities represents one explanation for the declining
net interest result for German savings banks and other retail banks with a funding deficit.
The implications of our analysis are first, that the example of Germany supports the view
that the function of deposits matters (Merton 1995). On the one hand, following demand-
side arguments, checking accounts are unlikely to be affected by the structural change
because these products are unique means of payment (Kashyap et al. 2002; Bossone 2001).
Demand deposits are provided exclusively by banks and represent a significant feature of
banks’ specialness. Supply-side arguments suggest that demand deposits and checking
accounts provide banks with proprietary information that can be used for monitoring
borrowers (Mester et al. 2007; Norden and Weber 2010). Consequently, there are liquidity
and informational synergies between deposit taking and lending. On the other hand, banks,
non-bank financial intermediaries, and financial markets also offer financial products with
an investment function. Our data indicate that savings deposits steadily decrease in relative
importance, which leads to structural changes in bank funding modes and to a lengthening
of the intermediation chain for investment products. Second, given the relative change of
funding structures and the simultaneous growth in lending, there is a strategic need for
alternative funding modes for retail banks. Relying on demand deposits is clearly not
sufficient in the long run, and wholesale funding has its own limitations (e.g., Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga 2009; Huang and Ratnovski 2009), as illustrated by the market freeze
during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. More flexible rules for bond and commercial
paper issuances, as well as asset securitization, might be ways to deal with strategic
imbalances between the lending and deposit taking of surplus and deficit banks. Third, the
structural lengthening of the intermediation chain implies that financial intermediaries have
become more connected, which has implications for financial deepening and growth of the
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economy but also increases the risk of contagion effects. Therefore, we believe that central
banks, financial markets- and bank supervisors should carefully monitor the evolution of
domestic and international wholesale markets and its impact on systemic liquidity and
financial stability.
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Appendix 1
Table 7 Variable categories and definitions. The Δ-variables and GROWTH are percentage changes of
absolute balance items (except ΔNIR and ΔPROV which are measured in percentage points)
Variable category Variable Definition Units
Funding modes ΔIBL Interbank liabilities (deposits from banks) %
ΔDEP Deposits from customers %
ΔDEM Demand deposits from customers %
ΔSAV Savings deposits from customers %
ΔTIME Time deposits from customers %
ΔBOND Bonds %
Bank assets ΔIBR Interbank receivables (credits to banks) %
ΔLOAN Loans to customers %
ΔSEC Securities holdings %
Bank performance ΔNIR (Net interest income)/(total assets) Percentage points
Net interest income = Interest income from
lending, money market transactions, and
fixed-income securities—interest expenses
on deposits and securities (not included:
write-offs, loan loss provisions)
Bank characteristics ΔPROVt Net change in loan loss provisions/(total assets) Percentage points
ΔEQRAT Bank capital/(total assets) %
MERGE One if bank is involved in a merger as an
acquirer, zero otherwise
Dummy
EAST One if bank’s head office is located in
Eastern Germany, zero otherwise
Dummy
CITYSTATE One if bank’s head office is located in
Berlin, Hamburg, or Bremen, zero otherwise
Dummy
SIZE Log (total assets) Thousands of EUR
GROWTH Log [(total assets in t)/(total assets in t-1)] %
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